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I. INTRODUCTION
The efficacy of the market for corporate control1 as a powerful mecha-
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1. For the seminal statement of the market for corporate control thesis, which holds that the
threat of a change in control provides incumbent managers with the incentive to maximize share
value, see Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). For
a summary of the role of the market for corporate control in the modern contractual theory of the
corporation, see Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11:4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 99
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nism for disciplining disloyal and inept corporate managers has been
demonstrated by numerous empirical studies2 and validated by the ex-
treme efforts to which some corporate leaders have gone to influence
public policies affecting the market for corporate control. Efforts to re-
strict the takeover market have been manifest in numerous public poli-
cies and policy proposals. Legal commentators have correctly identified
the passage of state takeover statutes,' increased and expanded enforce-
ment of insider trading regulations,4 proposed changes in the federal in-
come tax treatment of certain corporate interest payments,5 plant closing
legislation,6 and antitrust enforcement7 as poorly disguised attempts to
impede the market for corporate control. Such restrictions undoubtedly
harm the efficiency of the United States economy.
One aspect of regulating the market for corporate control that has yet
to be addressed is the impact of banking regulations 8 on takeover activ-
ity. Banks and savings and loan associations are important to takeover
activity for two reasons. First, commercial banks often provide financing
to acquiring firms at the crucial early stages of the takeover process.
Banks might make short-term "bridge" loans and commitments to the
acquiring firm while the deal is being consummated and before long-term
(1989). For legal commentary based on the market for corporate control, see Fischel, Efficient Capi-
tal Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
TEx. L. REV. 1 (1978); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698
(1982) (buyouts increase societal welfare by minimizing the monitoring costs associated with the
separation of ownership and control of publicly held corporations); Repetti, Management Buyouts,
Efficient Markets Fair Value, and Soft Information, 67 N.C.L. REV. 121, 124-25 (1988); Easter-
brook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1981).
2. For a review of the evidence, see Jarrell, Brickley, & Netter, The Market for Corporate
Controk The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988).
3. See Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Char-
ters, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 365; Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV.
111 (1987).
4. See, eg., Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider
Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984); Macey, From Judicial Solutions to Political Solutions: The
New, New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 355 (1988).
5. See, eg., Ribstein & Adler, Debt, Leveraged Buyouts, and Corporate Governance, Cato Insti-
tute Policy Analysis, No. 120 (May 2, 1989).
6. See generally PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES? (R. McKenzie ed. 1984).
7. See, eg., Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 787 (1989). See also California v. American Stores, 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990) (states have author-
ity to seek divestiture in Clayton Act antimerger cases).
8. This Article uses the phrase "banking regulation" in the generic sense to mean regulation of
all banking institutions including commercial banks, bank holding companies, savings and loans,
and thrifts.
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financing can be arranged.9 Often these short-term loans are paid off
when the acquiring firm sells so-called "junk bonds." 10 Occasionally
banks also make long-term loans to acquiring firms. Second, during the
1980s, savings and loan associations became an important buyer of junk
bonds-that is, an important source of funds for takeovers. The develop-
ment of junk bonds presented savings and loans (S&Ls) with another
9. One of the more controversial areas of bank involvement in corporate acquisition financing
involves financing the leveraged buyout (LBO). In its simplest terms an LBO is "a transaction in
which a company's capital stock or its assets are purchased with borrowed money causing the com-
pany's new capital structure to be primarily debt." S. REED & LANE & EDsoN, P.C., THE ART OF
M&A: A MERGER/AcQuIsmoN/BuyouT GUIDE 2-3 (1989) [hereinafter THE ART OF M&A]. In
other words, a leveraged buyout is a form of corporate restructuring in which a small group of
investors (usually the corporation's management) generates cash by selling large amounts of debt in
order to buy all or most of the corporation's stock. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 816 (3d ed. 1988). LBO debt is often financed, at least in part, through so-
called junk bonds. See infra note 10.
To understand bank involvement in an LBO acquisition, it is necessary to look closely at the
mechanics of LBO acquisitions. Often the acquiring corporation will form a holding company and
acquire a large block of the target company's shares on the open market. The acquiring firm will
then make a tender offer directly to the target firm's shareholders to buy a certain percentage of the
target firm's stock. See Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, The Economics of Leveraged Takeovers, 65 WASH.
U.L.Q. 163, 167-69 (1987). Once the tender offer is completed, the target firm merges with the
holding company; the new corporation's assets are managed by the parent acquiring corporation.
Id.
The tender offer is financed by the holding company's borrowing. Typically, there are three layers
of financing: the senior debt layer, the subordinated debt layer (also referred to as mezzanine financ-
ing), and the equity layer. See, eg., Greve, Management Buy-outs and LBOs, THE MERGERS AND
AcQuISITIONs HANDBOOK 349-52 (M. Rock ed. 1987). The senior lenders hold both secured and
unsecured debt. This group consists largely of commercial banks, and usually constitutes about half
of the total value of the LBO transaction. A. MICHEL & I. SHAKED, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO A
SUCCESSFUL LEVERAGED BUYOUT 183 (1988). Subordinated debt is generally held by large institu-
tional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies. These securities normally have
characteristics of both debt and equity. Id. at 186-88. They are riskier than the senior debt securi-
ties-if junk bonds are used in the transaction, they will be used at this level. THE ART OF M&A,
supra, at 157-58.
Equity investment generally makes up the smallest of the three financing layers. As the residual
class of investors, this is the riskiest of the three layers and therefore offers the highest rate of return.
In most LBOs, the participating management group is required by the institutional investors to
acquire an equity investment, thereby giving the managers a greater incentive to be successful.
Greve, supra, at 351.
10. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 9, at 816. The term junk bond describes any debt
security classified below investment grade by the bond rating services. Id. at 307. "Junk bonds are
medium- to long-term obligations (10-15 years) of the target that (1) are subordinated to its senior
debt, (2) are normally unsecured, and (3) bear high interest rates (13-17%). THE ART OF M&A,
supra note 9, at 157. The label 'junk bond' is as deceptive as it is pejorative. The label implies there
are two general classes of bonds: investment grade and 'junk.' However, there is a wide range of
quality within each category. Comment, Junk Bonds: Do They Have a Value?, 35 EMORY L.J. 921
(1986) (authored by Michael D. Floyd).
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investment opportunity that was far superior in basic financial terms to
many of the other investment options allowed under thrift regulations. 11
These two areas of banking regulation that affect takeovers have un-
dergone substantial changes in recent years. First, changes in bank capi-
tal adequacy guidelines and related regulations have altered the
treatment of loans to finance changes in corporate control in a manner
that increases the bank financing cost of takeovers. Second, statutory
changes have eliminated the ability of thrifts to purchase junk bonds,
thereby eliminating an important source of funds for corporate control
transactions. In both instances, the new regulations do not come close to
attaining their stated goals of increased safety and soundness in the bank-
ing system. In fact, both sets of regulations have the potential to increase
the riskiness of bank asset portfolios.12 Thus, the regulatory changes not
only adversely affect bank safety and soundness, they also decrease over-
all corporate efficiency.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the historical development of
the regulation of bank capital, focusing on the 1989 risk-based capital
adequacy regulations as well as the 1989 highly leveraged transaction
guidelines and their impact on the banking industry's involvement in
takeover transactions. This section also shows how the perverse incen-
fives created by the present system of federal deposit insurance impact on
the takeover market. Part III discusses the role of thrifts in corporate
takeovers and the effect of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989,13 including its prohibition on thrifts'
purchasing junk bonds. The concluding section speculates as to why
these seemingly unwise regulations were adopted.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
12. Because increasing the riskiness of banks and S&Ls is at odds with the stated purpose of the
regulatory changes, one might infer that the regulations were intended to protect politically-influen-
tial, entrenched corporate managers by restricting bank and thrift financing of corporate control
transactions, thereby impeding the market for corporate control. One of the fundamental tenets of
public choice economics is that the true purpose of legislation should be inferred from its conse-
quences, not from the legislative history. See, eg., Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (infer legislative intent from the probable consequences of the
action). For applications of public choice economics to banking regulations, see Butler & Macey,
The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677 (1988); Macey,
Special Interest Groups Legislation, and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33
EMORY L. J. 1 (1984); Shughart, A Public Choice Perspective of the Banking Act of 1933, in THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION: POLICY DIRECIONS FOR THE FUTURE 87 (C. England & T.
Huertas eds. 1988).
13. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
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II. CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS, REGULATORY POLICY,
AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
The federal government has long been interested in the safety and
soundness of the banking industry. As part of their effort to provide
macroeconomic stability and to protect the deposit insurance system,
bank regulators have generated an abundance of regulations designed,
among other things, to reduce banks' risk exposure.14 The most often
relied upon types of regulations involve bank capital requirements.
Banking regulators have traditionally looked at bank capital as a buffer
to absorb unexpected losses and as a means of maintaining public confi-
dence in the banking system. Capital regulations invariably center on the
concept of "capital adequacy." Capital adequacy refers to the minimum
level of capital that regulators feel is necessary for the safe and sound
operation of a bank.I5
Capital adequacy became a major concern of bank regulators in the
1980s for several reasons. First, bank capital ratios declined throughout
the 1970s and 1980s.16 Second, there was a general perception that there
was an increase in riskiness of bank assets during this period, especially
in view of potential losses on loans to less-developed countries. Finally,
the collapse of the S&L industry focused regulators' attention on meth-
ods of controlling bank risk taking: chief among these methods was reg-
ulation of capital. These factors led regulators to impose new risk-based
capital guidelines in 1989.17
This section begins with a review of the historical origins of bank capi-
tal regulations, followed by a summary and critique of capital adequacy
regulations as a means of increasing bank safety and soundness. This
section then explores alternative means for regulating bank risk. The
highly-leveraged transaction guidelines issued by the banking regulators
in May 1989 and their ineffectiveness in providing safety and soundness
to the banking system are also discussed. Finally, this section analyzes
both the capital adequacy regulations and the highly-leveraged transac-
14. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 3 (1990).
15. See, eg., Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Pru-
dential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHio ST. L.J. 1299, 1302 (1989).
16. Keeley, Bank Capital Regulation in the 1980a- Effective or Ineffective?, ECON. REV. FED.
RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRAN. 3, 3 (Winter 1988).
17. See, eg., Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomrn. on General Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Capital Hearings].
1990]
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tion guidelines as impediments to the efficient operation of the market for
corporate control.
A. Background
From the earliest days of the republic, both the state and federal gov-
ernments have contributed to the regulation of banks. 8 Through 1837,
both the state and federal governments limited their involvement in bank
regulation to the chartering process. 9 The period of 1837-1933 saw an
increase in the amount of federal banking regulation, particularly with
the creation of the Federal Reserve system in 1913.20 Not until the Great
Depression, however, did both the amount and intrusiveness of federal
banking regulations increase dramatically.21
By the early 1930s, the financial services industry in the United States
"had been totally discredited. ' '22 The Congress responded with the pas-
sage of the Banking Act of 1933,23 popularly known as the Glass-Steagall
Act. The Glass-Steagall Act introduced sweeping reforms, including the
segregation of the banking and securities industries24 as well as the crea-
tion of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).25
The system of federal deposit insurance created in 1933 assesses a pre-
mium on all insured banks at the same base rate.26 The problem with the
flat rate is its inability to account for the risk variations of different banks
18. For a thorough discussion of the history of banking regulation, see A. CARRON, RE-
FORMING THE BANK REGULATORY STRUcruRE (1984); Huertas, The Regulation of Financial Insti-
tutions: A Historical Perspective on Current Issues, in FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE CHANGING
INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNmENT PoLIcY (G. Benston ed. 1983); Victor, Regulation-Defined Fi-
nancial Market" Fragmentation and Integration in Financial Services, in WALL STREET AND REG-
ULATION 7 (S. Hayes ed. 1987).
19. Huertas, supra note 18, at 8-10.
20. Id. at 10-18; Victor, supra note 18, at 8-15.
21. The large volume of banking legislation in the decade following the Great Depression in-
cluded the following: The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1988); The
Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227 and ch. 2, 3, 6 (1988); The Federal Credit Union Act of 1934,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-90, 1795 (1988); The Banking Act of 1935, 12 U.S.C. § 228 and ch. 1-6, 13
(1988).
22. Victor, supra note 18, at 15.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 227 and ch. 2, 3, 6 (1988).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988). Today, Glass-Steagall is most often understood to mean that nar-
row part of the original act which separated commercial banking from investment banking.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988). Even in 1933, some healthy banks opposed the adoption of de-
posit insurance for fear that it would cause a moral hazard problem.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1989). Since 1989, savings and loan associations have also been insured
by the FDIC under this provision.
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and savings and loans.2 7 This scheme encourages risk taking because
banks know they will pay the same premium no matter how risky their
loans are; therefore, banks are more likely to make high risk loans be-
cause of their correspondingly higher rate of return.28 In addition, there
is no incentive for depositors to monitor bank risk taking because the
government has guaranteed their deposits.29 This creates the so-called
"moral hazard"-an incentive for banks to engage in riskier activity be-
cause of their ability to shift the costs of risk taking to the insurance
fund. This problem becomes particularly acute in times of trouble: the
closer the bank is to insolvency, the more willing it is to embark on ex-
tremely risky ventures in a desperate attempt to save the bank. When no
market incentives exist for controlling risk taking, regulation is crucial to
the protection of the federal deposit insurance system."
27. Indeed, the banking regulators recognized this problem in 1983 stating, "The fact that the
present assessment structure does not consider individual risk is an undeniable flaw-but one that
has not caused much concern until recently." FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FED-
ERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, & NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADVISORY BOARD, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE (June 1983). To date no action has been taken to
change the premium structure of federal deposit insurance.
28. See generally, R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 9, at 392 (as return on an asset in-
creases, so does risk).
29. See, ag., H. BUTLER, BEYOND THE BAILOUT: LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS IN
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 5 (Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 696, 1989); Scott, De-
posit Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 Bus. LAW. 907 (1989). Although the
insurance system is in theory limited, in practice there is de facto coverage of all depositors and
creditors. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE PUB. No. 89-47, TROUBLED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
SOLUTIONS TO THE THRIFT PROBLEM 121 (Feb. 1989).
30. However, in the absence of federal deposit insurance, it is not at all clear from economic
theory that minimum capital standards are necessary for the safety and soundness of banks. See,
ag., Macey & Miller, Bank Failures Risk Monitoring, and the Marketfor Bank Control, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1153 (1988); Pringle, The Capital Decision in Commercial Banks, 29 J. FIN. 779 (1974);
Blair & Heggestad, Bank Portfolio Regulation and the Probability of Bank Failure, 10 J. MONEY,
CREDIT, & BANKING 88 (1978). But see Taggart & Greenbaum, Bank Capital and Public Regula-
tion, 10 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 158 (1978). In addition to arguing that capital require-
ments are needed to prevent bank failures, proponents of the risk-based capital standards argue that
such measures instill confidence in the banking system. See, eg., Santomero & Watson, Determining
an Optimal Capital Standard for the Banking Industry, 32 J. FIN. 1267, 1270 (1977); Mingo, Regula-
tory Influence on Bank Capital Investment, 30 J. FIN. 1112 (1975). However, there are means more
effective than regulating capital to build confidence in the banking system. These means include
federal (or private) deposit insurance, bank examinations, and the Federal Reserve Board as the
lender of last resort. Pringle, supra, at 779. In fact, the necessity of bank capital adequacy require-
ments is found in the ill-conceived federal deposit insurance system that eliminates many market
incentives to limit risk taking. With the advent of deposit insurance, virtually all of a bank's deposits
are guaranteed, so there is little or no direct cost to depositors when a bank fails. It is true that bank
failures drain the resources of the federal deposit insurance agencies, and therefore place an addi-
tional tax burden on society. However, rather than change bank capital standards, those agencies
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Banks' capital adequacy did not become a regulatory concern, how-
ever, until the post-World War II era. In the mid-1950s, the Federal
Reserve Board devised a strategy that assigned arbitrary risk weights to
the assets making up a bank's capital.31 The risk-asset approach to bank
examination did not become the prevailing view among banking regula-
tors until the 1970s with the rise of bank holding companies,32 which fall
within the regulatory purview of the Federal Reserve Board.33
The Comptroller of the Currency took a somewhat different view of
capital adequacy. The Comptroller determined a bank's capital ade-
quacy on a case-by-case basis in light of the bank's overall health.34 By
the end of the 1970s, the Comptroller's rating system became accepted as
an interagency standard, promulgated in 1978 as the Uniform Inter-
agency Bank Rating System (CAMEL System).35
In addition to the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the
Currency, the FDIC also monitors capital adequacy. Before a bank may
receive a certificate to do business as an insured bank, the FDIC must
consider several factors, including the adequacy of the bank's capital
structure.36
Although banks' capital adequacy has been a regulatory concern since
World War II, formal bank capital adequacy guidelines were issued for
the first time in 198 1.37 The 1981 regulatory guidelines divided banking
could more effectively achieve their regulatory goals by improving their monitoring of banks, possi-
bly by charging the more risk-prone banks a higher deposit insurance premium. See, e.g., Taggart &
Greenbaum, supra, at 168 (when insurance fee does not reflect risk, banks are encouraged to shift
costs to the deposit fund).
31. Norton, supra note 15, at 1317.
32. Id.
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1988).
34. The Comptroller's office considered the following factors when evaluating capital adequacy:
the quality of management; liquidity of assets; the history of earnings and of the retention
thereof; the quality and character of ownership; the burden of meeting occupancy ex-
penses; potential volatility of the banks' deposit structure; the quality of operating proce-
dures; and the bank's capacity to meet present and future financial needs of its trade area,
considering the competition it faces.
Norton, supra note 15, at 1318 (quoting Charles Van Horn, former Regional Administrator of Na-
tional Banks for the Second Region).
35. The CAMEL system looks at 5 aspects of bank operations: Capital adequacy, Asset qual-
ity, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. The bank's soundness is then given a rating based on
these factors. Id. at 1320, n.86.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1988).
37. See Joint News Release of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board,
1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) I 5554A (Dec. 17, 1981). This discussion ignores the nominal statu-
tory minimum capital requirements for issuance of a national bank charter. See 12 U.S.C. § 51
(1988).
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institutions into three classes: community, regional, and multinational.
Community banks were required to maintain a minimum capital-to-asset
ratio of six percent, regional banks were required to maintain a five per-
cent ratio, and multinational banks were to be considered on a case-by-
case basis.3" Prior to 1983, however, no statutory requirement of a mini-
mum capital level for banks existed. Therefore, the regulators' primary
remedy against nonconforming banks was to issue a cease and desist or-
der on the grounds that noncompliance was an unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practice.39 First National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the
Currency' constitutes the first challenge to the Comptroller's authority
to issue cease and desist orders in cases of inadequate bank capital. The
Bellaire court vacated a cease and desist order of the Comptroller requir-
ing the bank to raise its capital-to-assets ratio to not less than seven
percent.41
In 1983, Congress passed the International Lending Supervision Act
(ILSA),4 2 requiring the federal banking agencies to set minimum capital
requirements. At the request of the Comptroller, Congress included sec-
tion 3907(a)(2) to overrule Bellaire by giving each federal banking agency
"the authority to establish such minimum level of capital for a banking
institution as... [that] agency, in its discretion, deems to be necessary
"43
After Bellaire and the passage of the ILSA, the Comptroller devised
minimum capital ratios for national banks.' The regulation divides
bank capital into primary and secondary capital.45 National banks must
"maintain total capital equal to at least 6 percent of... assets and pri-
mary capital equal to at least 5 percent of... assets. ' 46 However, the
Comptroller has the discretion to require higher minimum capital
38. Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Banks, Examining Circular 206, 1
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 5554A (Dec. 18, 1981).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1818QOXl) (1988). However, "most banks did cave in under agency pressure"
applied through the cease and desist order. Horvitz, More is Better as Far as Capital Requirements
Go, Am. Banker, Apr. 24, 1986 at 4, col. 1. Other remedies available to regulators include the right
to condition or deny applications based on financial factors as well as the power to restrict dividend
payouts, resort to more frequent examination (at the bank's expense), and other coercive tactics.
40. 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 684-87.
42. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (1988).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 3907(aX2) (1988).
44. See 12 C.F.R. § 3 (1990).
45. Id at § 3.2 (c)-(e).
46. Id at § 3.6.
1990]
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ratios.47
. The 1989 Risk-Based Capital Regulations
The concern with risk intensified in the 1980s,48 largely because of
"deteriorating asset quality, increases in off-balance sheet activity and de-
clining capital ratios."49 This concern, combined with the beginnings of
the S&L debacle, prompted the Comptroller, along with the FDIC and
the Federal Reserve Board, to propose risk-based capital standards for
banks in 1987.50 The three agencies published final regulations early in
1989.51
The new risk-based capital adequacy guidelines are designed to force
banks to restructure their asset portfolios to include more low risk assets
such as cash or government securities. The new capital guidelines, which
are to be phased in over a three year period, raise the minimum capital-
to-assets ratio to eight percent.5 2 The major innovations of the new regu-
lations include a system for weighting the riskiness of bank assets and
new definitions of capital.
The new regulations require banks to maintain capital equal to a per-
centage of the face value of the bank's assets. The percentage varies with
the riskiness of each asset. In assigning risk weights, balance sheet assets
are divided into four categories: zero percent (e.g., cash and cash
equivalents); twenty percent (e.g., short term claims guaranteed by U.S.
depository institutions); fifty percent (e.g., loans secured by first liens on
one to four family residences); and one hundred percent (e.g., commer-
cial loans).5" The dollar value of the assets in each category is multiplied
by the risk weight assigned to that category. Off-balance sheet items,
such as standby letters of credit and performance bonds, are multiplied
47. Id at § 3.10.
48. See, eg., Capital Hearings, supra note 17.
49. Keeley, supra note 16, at 3.
50. Joint News Release of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1985-87 Transfer Binder
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 86,776 at 92,172 (Jan. 8, 1987).
51. See 54 Fed. Reg. 4168 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 3, 3.100) [hereinafter Comp-
troller's Guidelines] (Comptroller's risk-based capital guidelines); 54 Fed. Reg. 4186 (1989) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 208, 225) [hereinafter Board Guidelines] (Federal Reserve Board's risk-
based capital guidelines); 54 Fed. Reg. 11,500 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 325) [hereinafter
FDIC Policy] (FDIC's policy on risk-based capital). The regulations are virtually identical; this
paper will use those issued by the Comptroller of the Currency as a reference.
52. Comptroller's Guidelines, supra note 51, at 4182.
53. Id. at 4180-81.
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by an appropriate conversion factor (zero, twenty, fifty, or one hundred
percent) to arrive at an on-balance sheet credit equivalent, which is then
assigned one of the four risk weights.54 The risk-weighted assets total is
the sum of the results for each category.55
In addition to providing risk weights for assets, the new regulations
redefine capital. Capital is divided into "Core" or "Tier 1" capital and
"Supplementary" or "Tier 2" capital. Tier 1 capital consists primarily of
common and perpetual noncumulative preferred stock. Tier 2 capital
consists of perpetual preferred stock, mandatory convertible debt, loan
loss reserves, certain forms of term-subordinated debt, and limited-life
preferred stock.56 In calculating total capital, goodwill is subtracted
from Tier 1 capital, subject to a grandfathering provision.57 At least fifty
percent of total capital must be Tier 1 capital, and up to ten percent of
Tier 1 capital can be comprised of Tier 2 capital elements.5"
The risk-based capital ratio is equal to total capital divided by the sum
of the risk-weighted assets.59 By December 31, 1992, this ratio must be
eight percent; also by that date at least fifty percent of total capital must
be made up of Tier 1 elements. However, there are rules for the transi-
tion period. By December 31, 1990, all banks are expected to maintain a
minimum ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets of seven and one-
quarter percent6' (up from the present six percent requirement61).
In formulating a risk-based capital ratio, banking regulators have at-
tempted to increase the safety and soundness of the banking system. The
new regulations are designed to make riskier banks incur the costs associ-
ated with meeting the capital adequacy guidelines. To that end, the risk-
based guidelines should deter excessive bank risk taking by increasing the
capital requirement for riskier assets, making those assets less attractive
to banks. The new regulations, however, create efficiency as well as
safety and soundness problems of their own. These problems will be ad-
dressed below.
54. FDIC Policy, supra note 51, at 11,512.
55. Id. at 11,511.
56. Comptroller's Guidelines, supra note 51, at 4179.
57. "Goodwill that national banks have been allowed to count as capital as a result of the
transition rules contained in 12 C.F.R. 3.3 is grandfathered until December 31, 1992, but will be
deducted from Tier I capital after that date." Comptroller's Guidelines, supra note 51, at 4182.
58. Id.
59. FDIC Policy, supra note 51, at 11,516.
60. Comptroller's Guidelines, supra note 51, at 4182.
61. 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1990).
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L Economic Consequences of the Regulations
The concept of promoting safety and soundness in the banking indus-
try by formulating risk-based capital guidelines presumes that such
guidelines will tend to limit banks' risk taking. The new regulations do
provide some incentive for banks to hold less risky assets; whether these
incentives will produce more than a marginal effect is not clear. How-
ever, the new regulations will potentially harm the economy in at least
four respects.
First, the regulations may lead to an increase in overcapitalized
banks.62 This hurts society by diverting capital from more productive
uses. In addition, by artificially constraining bank asset portfolios, the
new regulations may have the effect of increasing the risk exposure of
banks. These costs are better understood by analyzing the incentives cre-
ated by the new regulations. The new capital-to-asset ratio is derived by
dividing total capital by the risk weighted assets.63 This gives banks an
incentive to hold less risky assets, which have lower assigned risk
weights, such as cash or government securities; the higher the number of
low risk securities, the smaller the total of risk-weighted assets. To meet
62. Viewed properly, the question of bank capital adequacy includes at least two offsetting
costs: the cost of bank failure from insufficient capitalization, and the cost of forced overcapitaliza-
tion imposed on the bank and on society in general (in terms of foregone opportunities that would
otherwise be available to banks without capital requirements). Santomero & Watson, supra note 30,
at 1267-68 (1977). Further analysis of the two costs of bank capital adequacy reveals that the cost of
bank failure from insufficient capitalization is arguably much less than the cost of forced overcapital-
ization imposed on the bank. Of course the existence of federal deposit insurance skews any discus-
sion of what is or is not adequate capitalization. It is arguable that in a system where the taxpayers
bear the cost of bank failures, the existence of overcapitalized banks is a fair trade off for fewer bank
failures. However, this premise presumes that bank failure is linked to bank capitalization. Capital
requirements have little, if any, relation to the goal of achieving safety and soundness in the banking
industry. First, it is not clear that insufficient capitalization actually costs society in terms of in-
creased bank failures. At least one commentator believes "[e]mpirical studies have found no signifi-
cant relationship between capital positions and bank failure." Pringle, supra note 30, at 779. Banks
do not fail because they are undercapitalized, but rather because "the [bank] has not responded to
market forces with a satisfactory mix of price and product performance relative to its competitors in
the industry or else the product the [bank] is offering is not in sufficient demand by consumers to
justify its production in the first place." Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 1155.
Even if banks do sometimes fail because of insufficient capitalization, some would argue that occa-
sional bank failures are good for the economy as indicators that markets are working to penalize
inefficient operations. Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & ECON. 129 (1967).
63. FDIC Policy, supra note 51, at 11,516. See generally Malloy, U.S. International Banking
and the New Capital Adequacy Requirements: New, Old, and Unexpected, 7 ANN. REv. oF BANKING
L. 75, 88-105 (1988) (demonstrates how to calculate the capital-to-assets ratio under the new
regulations).
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the higher capital-to-asset ratios of the new regulations, banks will face
several choices: raise capital through the sale of equity or debt, retain
additional earnings, or reduce their asset base (thereby reducing the pro-
portional amount of capital they must raise or retain relative to assets)."
An obvious result of the new capital requirements is that banks' asset
portfolio growth will be constrained, 65 and the composition of those asset
portfolios may be affected. Banks are encouraged to limit the amount of
high risk, and therefore high return, assets in their portfolios because
high risk assets are weighted more heavily, requiring banks to retain a
larger amount of capital.
Second, the selection of risk weights reflects an explicit decision to
channel financial resources into one sector of the economy and away
from other sectors. For example, the housing industry may be favored
by treating home mortgages as low risk investments. This type of gov-
ernment "credit rationing"-similar to the type of central planning
found in socialist states-is antithetical to free market principles al-
lowing resources to flow to their highest value use as determined by mar-
ket signals.
Third, the costs of credit rationing may have immediate adverse conse-
quences on the performance of corporate managers by interfering with
the market for corporate control. The asset portfolios of many banks
include loans made to corporations to finance leveraged buyouts. These
loans fall into the one hundred percent risk weight category.66 To the
extent the new guidelines discourage banks from holding assets in the
one hundred percent risk weight category, they will discourage banks
from financing leveraged takeovers. If increasing the efficiency and com-
petitiveness of the American economy is the goal of economic policies,
then the new capital regulations, which discourage such transactions, are
not desirable from a policy perspective.
Fourth, not only are the new capital requirements potentially harmful
to the efficient allocation of resources, they are potentially harmful to
individual banks and to the federal deposit insurance fund by actually
increasing the probability of bank failure. While limiting the amount of
high risk assets a bank may hold would seem a desirable regulatory pol-
64. See, eg., Norton, supra note 15, at 1314; Keeley, Banks' Cost of Capital, FED. RES. BD.
WKLY. LETTER (Mar. 17, 1989). Note, however, that a reduction in a bank's asset base reduces the
absolute amount of capital it must raise, but not the amount of capital relative to assets.
65. Norton, supra note 15, at 1314. See generally Mingo, supra note 30, at 1112.
66. Comptroller's Guidelines, supra note 51, at 4181.
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icy, such a policy may increase the probability of bank failure. Blair and
Heggestad have shown that this type of portfolio regulation forces banks
to inefficient frontiers,67 thereby decreasing the safety and soundness of
the banking system. Indeed, basic portfolio theory indicates that regula-
tors should not concern themselves with the types of assets a bank
selects, but rather should look at the overall return and variance of the
bank's portfolio.68
Thus, the economic analysis of bank capital regulations suggests that
the regulations cannot achieve their desired goals and may lead to results
contrary to the overall purposes of banking regulations.
2. Alternatives to the Risk-Based Capital Regulations
The analysis of the preceding subsection suggests that the new risk-
based capital regulations are inefficient and potentially harmful to the
banking system and to the economy in general. Regulators could better
achieve safety and soundness in the banking system by focusing their
regulations in different directions. In the most basic terms, the economic
criticisms of capital regulations suggest that the best way to achieve
safety and soundness in the banking system is to monitor and penalize
excessive risk taking either by reforming the current capital guidelines, or
by restructuring the deposit insurance system to rely more on market
mechanisms, such as the bond market, to better monitor bank risk tak-
ing. Two possible avenues for reform of the present system should be
pursued.
First, if capital regulation is to be the method for controlling bank risk,
regulators should focus on the optimal level of capital rather than an
"adequate" level of capital for a bank. Pringle suggests that optimality
could be achieved both in terms of risk bearing and in terms of maturity
structure of liabilities.69 Indeed, Santomero and Watson would maxi-
mize societal welfare by equating the marginal returns from bank capital
requirements to the marginal cost of capitalization.7" However, this may
be easier said than done; from the standpoint of banking regulators, es-
pecially the FDIC, the more capital, the better. The political economy of
banking regulation in the aftermath of the S&L debacle suggests that
67. Blair & Heggestad, supra note 30, at 88-90.
68. Id. at 92. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYrns, supra note 9, at 149-65 (basic discussion
of risk, return, and portfolio theory).
69. Pringle, supra note 30, at 780.
70. Santomero & Watson, supra note 30, at 1277.
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banking regulators are now more inclined to err on the side of driving
permissible risk taking below the optimal level.
In terms of controlling risk, bank regulators would probably do better
by not trying to regulate the individual elements of the asset portfolio.
Instead, the riskiness of the portfolio could be controlled by regulating
the total return and variance of the portfolio. The current regulations
only look at the credit risk of individual bank assets. However, a well-
diversified portfolio can eliminate much of the unique risk associated
with any one asset.71 This type of portfolio regulation would be more
efficient because it would control risk without forcing banks to sacrifice
profits from the riskier loans.72
A second alternative is to rely solely on market forces to control risk,
eliminating any type of capital regulation, at least for the larger banks.73
Reforms that rely more heavily on market forces to control risk taking
could better provide for the bank regulators' well-founded obsession with
bank risk. Chief among these reforms would be a restructuring of the
deposit insurance system. Numerous approaches to deposit insurance re-
form have been proposed, including the privatization of deposit insur-
ance.74 All of the proposals are designed to deal with the moral hazard
inherent in the current federal deposit system. In the place of capital
requirements, regulators could allow the market to monitor bank per-
formance by requiring banks to float large amounts of a certain type of
subordinated bond.75 The bond market would then act as a monitor of
the performance of the bank. Banks with poorly performing bonds could
be subject to more frequent examinations and a higher deposit insurance
premium. This would certainly be more efficient, and would likely be an
easier method of monitoring at least the large banks. Proposals like this
one are in essence a recognition of the fact that regulators cannot effec-
tively monitor risk when all market incentives to control risk are elimi-
71. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 9, at 149.
72. See Blair & Heggestad, supra note 30, at 92.
73. Of course, much of the risk taking by large, publicly traded corporations could be con-
trolled by market forces emerging from the threat of the market for corporate control, except for the
fact that there are numerous impediments to a smoothly functioning market for bank control. See
Macey & Miller, supra note 30; Brickley & James, The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composi-
tion, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking, 30 J.L. & ECON. 161 (1987).
74. See, ag., Scott, Deposit Insurance-The Appropriate Roles for State and Federal Govern-
ments, 53 BRoOXa.YN L. REv. 27, 33-38 (1987) (discussion of several options to correct the moral
hazard inherent in the current federal deposit system rate structure).
75. Id. at 37-39.
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nated. Relying on, rather than eliminating, market incentives to control
risk taking would make the regulators' job far easier.
C. Regulation of Highly-Leveraged Transactions
The same concern with bank risk that led to the adoption of the 1989
risk-based capital adequacy guidelines was targeted toward bank involve-
ment in corporate transactions, specifically leveraged buyout (LBO) fi-
nancing. In general, the late 1980s witnessed considerable congressional
pressure to limit takeover activity and substantial resistance on the part
of regulators to clamp down on such activities.
Typical of the legislative response is the skeptical attitude toward LBO
financing taken by Congressman Henry Gonzalez, chairman of the
House Banking Committee. At a hearing on LBO financing before his
committee, Chairman Gonzalez expressed concern about the "leveraged
buyout mania of the 1980s" and its effect on the economy. He further
questioned "the wisdom of allowing federally insured deposits to finance
this type of lending."76 At a congressional hearing on LBOs, Kenneth
Pinkes, a vice-president of Moody's Investor Service, echoed the Chair-
man's concerns, noting that "there is a false sense of confidence about the
ability to analyze away risk" in LBO transactions.77 Many view LBOs as
evils in and of themselves and therefore applaud new regulations that
discourage banks from financing such ventures. 78 However, one should
not draw any conclusions from the rhetoric of politicians and embittered
corporate managers.
Although there is substantial disagreement in the academic world,
many legal commentators view LBOs as little more than an opportunity
for management to benefit at the expense of stockholders.79 Banking reg-
ulators, while recognizing the potential benefits of LBOs, take a some-
what wary approach. Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve
76. Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1989) [hereinafter LBO Hearings].
77. Id. at 21.
78. "[L]everaged buy outs are eating at the foundation of America's stock market economy."
LBO Hearings, supra note 76, at 7 (statement of Walter Fauntroy, District of Columbia Delegate).
"LBOs could operate to adversely affect the long term capital markets on which many corporations
rely ...." Id. at 57 (statement of John W. Dowdle, former Senior Vice-President of Financial
Services, RJR Nabisco). "[E]veryone would lose [in the takeover of Polaroid] except the raiders...
and investment bankers .... Id. at 92 (statement of Richard Duffy, Employees' Grass Roots
Coalition Against Hostile Takeovers).
79. See, eg., Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354, 1366 (1978).
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Board, has acknowledged that LBOs and other forms of takeovers im-
prove efficiency and enhance competition among corporations. Green-
span, however, remains concerned about LBOs in industries vulnerable
to business downturns.Y°
In response to congressional pressure on takeovers, regulators turned
their attention towards commercial loans used to finance corporate con-
trol transactions. In May of 1989, banking regulators announced that
special scrutiny should be given to bank involvement in takeover financ-
ing."1 This regulatory concern was ultimately codified in the highly-
leveraged transactions (HILT) guidelines promulgated in October 1989.82
Banking regulators defined HLT financing broadly enough to cover vir-
tually all bank financing of corporate control transactions.
This latest regulatory attempt, however, was misguided and will prob-
ably result in unintended consequences or the achievement of unstated
goals. The regulations are subject to the same criticisms levied at the
risk-based capital guidelines. For example, once again portfolio theory
tells us that the HLT regulations probably will not add to the safety and
soundness of the banking system; rather they will likely force banks to
operate inefficiently and may actually encourage bank failure. More effi-
cient alternatives exist to achieve the desired results. In addition to pos-
sibly diminishing the safety and soundness of the banking system, the
regulations will likely produce a second, less apparent outcome: a weak-
ened market for corporate control due to the increase in cost of bank
participation in efficiency-creating corporate takeover transactions, such
as leveraged buyouts.
80. Ricks, U.S. Regulators Tell Congress They Generally Favor Leveraged Buy-Outs, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 28, 1989, at A10, col. 4.
81. FDIC Guidelines for Highly Leveraged Transactions of May 10, 1989, 4 Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 49,271 (May 19, 1989).
82. In October 1989, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the Comptroller of the Currency jointly adopted the following definition of highly leveraged
transactions:
[A] bank or bank holding company is considered to be involved in a highly leveraged
transaction (HLT) when credit is extended or investment is made in a business where the
financing transaction involves the buyout, acquisition, or recapitalization of an existing
business. In addition to this purpose test, one of the following criteria must be met for the
transaction to be considered an HLT:
-The transaction at least doubles the subject company's liabilities and results in a
leverage ratio higher than 50%.
-The transaction results in a leverage ratio higher than 75%.
-The transaction is designated an HLT by a syndication agent.
Banking Circular 242, Oct. 30, 1989, Fed. Bank. L. Rep. (CCH) % 49,272 (Mar. 16, 1990).
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D. Impact on the Market for Corporate Control
Both the new capital adequacy regulations and the HLT guidelines
will decrease the efficiency of the market for corporate control. The capi-
tal adequacy guidelines provide banks with an incentive to avoid take-
over loans because there is a higher capital requirement against such
loans, as opposed to home mortgages, for example. The HLT regulations
give banks an incentive to limit their participation in loans to highly
leveraged corporations in order to avoid increased scrutiny by banking
regulators. Limited participation by banks in takeover loans means it
will be harder for investors to finance leveraged buyouts, thereby de-
creasing the number of takeover transactions and reducing the efficiency
of the market for corporate control.
From a policy perspective, it may appear that limiting bank involve-
ment in such risky transactions is a good thing. However, as indicated
earlier, risk must be assessed in terms of a bank's entire portfolio. A
bank should be able to diversify away much of the risk in any one trans-
action. In addition, several factors serve to reduce the riskiness of LBO
transactions. First, LBOs tend to occur in mature companies with large
cash flows. This facilitates the new owners' ability to repay the debt. In
addition, a relatively small group usually holds the debt, thereby increas-
ing their ability to monitor the new firm.83 Finally, the new owners are
usually directly involved with managing the new firm, thereby aligning
the incentives of ownership and management in the new firm. 4
On the other hand, as the firm's leverage increases, bankruptcy costs
increase. Bankruptcy costs include "the costs of bankruptcy per se and
the indirect costs associated with the effect that impending bankruptcy
may have on the incentives of stockholders to redistribute wealth from
debtholders in ways that reduce firm value.""5 Bankruptcy costs become
increasingly acute in recessionary times. These costs are partly offset by
the relatively fast repayment schedule of most LBO loans, usually five to
ten years, and by the realization that downturns in the business cycle will
have an adverse effect on all businesses.
There are arguments both for and against LBO financing. In the final
83. R. BREALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 9, at 816.
84. See Greve, supra note 9, at 351.
85. Lehn, Blackwell, & Marr, supra note 9, at 176. See generally Modigliani & Miller, The Cost
of Capital, Corporate Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (gen-
eral explanation of debt and equity financing and the costs associated with each). See also supra note
30 and accompanying text for an explanation of the related concept of moral hazard.
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analysis, the issue turns on who is in a better position to analyze the costs
and benefits of such transactions. It would be hard to argue that regula-
tors know more than the banking community about which loans banks
should or should not be making. Ideally, the market should decide
which banks are acting efficiently and which are not.8 6 Banks that make
sound loans will be rewarded by continued survival; banks which make
unsound loans will ultimately fail.
Unfortunately, the role of federal deposit insurance has mitigated the
effect of market discipline.8 7 The combined effects of a fiat rate premium
and de facto coverage of all depositors effectively insulates banks from
traditional market forces. By removing the monitoring function of the
marketplace, banking regulators can justify further regulation as the only
constraint on bank risk taking. Nevertheless, it appears that bank regu-
lators overstepped the extent of regulation justified on this ground when
they reduced the portfolio options available to banks. If the incentives
for risk taking are held constant, then new regulations do no more than
make it more difficult for banks to achieve their optimal level of risk.
III. JUNK BONDS, TAKEOVERS, AND FIRREA
Undoubtedly, junk bonds played an important role in the financing of
takeovers in the 1980s. Identifying the source of the demand for these
new financing instruments is an important issue when considering the
takeover. Where did all of the money come from? In part, the answer to
this question lies in the dramatic changes in the structure of federal de-
posit insurance programs in the early 1980s.
A. Partial Deregulation, Money Brokers, Deposit Insurance, and Junk
Bonds
The collapse of the savings and loan industry is often blamed on the
partial deregulation of thrifts in the early 1980s. However, the financial
condition of the thrift industry had deteriorated significantly in the late
1970s. The development of innovative financial products outside the
banking and thrift industries, such as money-market accounts, combined
with regulated limits on interest rates offered on accounts at banks and
S&Ls left thrifts often unable to offer interest rates high enough to attract
and retain savers. The ability to offer higher rates, however, would not
86. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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have provided much relief because, at that time, thrifts were essentially
limited to investing in home mortgages. With the downturn in the home
mortgage market of the 1970s, thrift profits plunged as depositor interest
rates rose above the return on long-term mortgage portfolios. It has been
estimated that, even before substantial deregulation in the 1980s, the
S&L industry's liability exceeded the market value of its assets by $150
billion.
The S&L industry was in serious trouble, and Congress tried to help
with a series of deregulatory steps. The Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act of 198088 increased the amount of fed-
eral deposit insurance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000 per person per
institution and provided for the gradual deregulation of interest rates
that could be paid on deposits by insured institutions-banks and S&Ls.
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 198289 attempted
to help the industry by providing S&Ls with new outlets for investing
their deposits. In addition to granting them the power to invest in junk
bonds, the Act permitted S&Ls to make equity or direct investments in
high-risk, speculative commercial real estate ventures. These changes
had a profound effect.
The regulatory changes led to the emergence of "money brokers"-a
type of middleman who channels deposits to institutions paying the high-
est interest rates. Federally insured institutions-banks or S&Ls-at-
tracted enormous amounts of deposits, virtually overnight, by offering
interest at rates slightly above the market. In addition, depositors had no
incentive to concern themselves with the safety or soundness of the de-
pository institutions because the federal government guaranteed the de-
posits. Some institutions, especially S&Ls, experienced phenomenal rates
of growth in both deposits and assets.
Although the increased investment powers of S&Ls and the increased
insured amount provided the opportunity for abuse, the structural de-
fects of the federal deposit insurance system90 must bear the blame for
the continued collapse of the S&L industry after the deregulatory actions
in the early 1980s. A basic problem shared by the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and FDIC9 is that, unlike most
88. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
89. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
90. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
91. Under FIRREA, the functions of the FSLIC were taken over by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823 (1988).
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forms of private insurance, the premiums paid by S&Ls and banks do not
reflect the risks actually covered by the insurer. The deposit insurance
system, with fiat rate premiums based on total deposits of each institu-
tion, encourages and subsidizes high-risk investing by managers of in-
sured institutions.92
Granting the additional powers to solvent S&Ls probably prevented
the failure of many marginal institutions. But giving these same powers
to insolvent thrifts exacerbated the moral hazard problem; they had
nothing to lose by making excessively risky investments in a desperate
attempt to get back into the black. Moreover, the structure of deposit
insurance compounded the problem because depositors had no reason to
avoid the riskier institutions-federal deposit insurance treats all firms
the same. In fact, depositors, through deposit brokers, were attracted to
riskier institutions because they tended to offer higher rates.93
B. The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of FIRREA
One important fact stands out through the turmoil of the S&L indus-
try in the 1980s-the first failure of an S&L attributed to junk bond
investments did not occur until February 1990. In spite of this fact, con-
gressional leaders singled out junk bonds as one of the major culprits in
the collapse of the S&L industry.94 The resulting statutory and regula-
tory changes in the savings and loan industry have had a tremendous
impact on the market for corporate control. The corporate takeover
mania of the 1980s has come to a screeching halt.
The most dramatic change came in the summer of 1989 with the pas-
sage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act (FIRREA).95 FIRREA provides radical reforms for the S&L indus-
try in an effort to curtail the current crisis. Among other things, the Act
provided $159 million to bail out the S&L industry, abolished the
FSLIC, and forced S&Ls to maintain the vast majority of their assets in
92. The problems of federal deposit insurance have long been recognized and discussed in the
scholarly literature. See, eg., E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSUR-
ANCE (1985).
93. See, eg., G. SHORT & J. GUNTHER, THE TEXAS THRIFT SrruATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE TEXAs FINANCIAL INDUSTRY (Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas Sept. 1988).
94. See, eg., Thomas, Fraud Is Called a Small Factor in S&L Cost: Consultant's Study Cites
Real Estate Values, High Rates, Wall St. J., July 20, 1990, at A2, col. 2 (Mr. Ely says, "To listen to
some people on Capitol Hill, you would think that junk bonds caused the end of Western civiliza-
tion. That's just not true.")
95. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
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housing and housing-related investments. Title 2 of the Act prohibits
S&Ls from directly or indirectly acquiring or retaining junk bonds; di-
vestment is required by July 1, 1994.
The provisions limiting S&L asset portfolios are unwise for several rea-
sons. First, they are ineffective ways to control risk. As shown previ-
ously, if regulators wish to limit an institution's riskiness, they must
consider the risk and return of the entire portfolio of assets, rather than
make blanket limitations on the types of assets available to S&Ls. By the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board's own admission, as late as 1988 there
was "no indication that investing in high yield bonds... [had] caused the
failure of a thrift institution. '96 It was only after the passage of FIRREA
that the junk bond market plummeted. Indeed, the empirical evidence
suggests that by limiting S&Ls' investment opportunities, FIRREA may
have actually increased their riskiness.97 The provision requiring thrifts
to divest themselves of junk bonds will also make it more difficult for
investors to finance takeover transactions, thereby making the market for
corporate control less efficient.
Although FIRREA was passed in response to the collapse of the S&L
industry, some of its provisions appear to have actually added to the
S&Ls troubles. For example, some evidence suggests that the provision
requiring divestment of junk bonds was responsible for the drop in the
junk bond market. In the last quarter of 1989, when the new law became
effective, junk bonds suffered their worst losses up to that point.98 This
had a severe impact on the S&L industry because many thrifts, particu-
larly the larger ones, held a significant number of junk bonds. Hence the
self-fulfilling prophecy of FIRREA: by requiring S&Ls to divest their
junk bond holdings, the Act caused the junk bond market to falter. This
in turn caused the asset portfolios of those S&Ls holding junk bonds to
decline, giving regulators the chance to point the finger at the junk bond
market as a major culprit in the S&L crisis. FIRREA has the dubious
distinction of both hindering the market for corporate control and ad-
ding to the costs of the S&L bailout.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The new risk-based capital regulations, the HLT guidelines, and FIR-
REA attempt to provide safety and soundness in the banking industry by
encouraging banks and thrifts to avoid holding risky assets. However,
the methods chosen by regulators result in reduced efficiency in the bank-
ing system, possibly increasing the risk of bank failure. By discouraging
banks from making high-yield, high-risk loans, banking regulators have
not only reduced the efficiency of the banking system, they have also
reduced the efficiency of the market for corporate control by discourag-
ing corporate control transactions, such as leveraged buyouts.
The efficiency of the banking system is further reduced by its built in
insulation from market discipline. The system of federal deposit insur-
ance, at the core of the modem banking system, has removed from bank
managers much of the incentive to monitor the performance of the bank.
Whether intentionally or not, the federal deposit insurance system has
created a need for some type of regulatory monitoring of bank risk taking
since banks no longer have adequate market incentives to monitor them-
selves. Unfortunately, the federal government has tried to fill this void
through such ill-advised regulatory efforts as the risk-based capital guide-
lines, the HLT guidelines, and FIRREA.
The effect of these regulations on the number of LBOs and other cor-
porate control transactions is not known. Regardless of the actual effect,
however, it makes little economic sense for banking regulators to attempt
to reduce this type of efficiency-generating transaction. Rather, regula-
tors must consider other, more efficient methods of risk regulation. This
may mean different methods of capital regulation, or it may require
abandoning capital regulation altogether. Finally, any system of risk reg-
ulation will have to address the problems and perverse incentives created
by the present system of federal deposit insurance.
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